SCOTUS Hears Oral Arguments in FDA Vaping Challenge and Three Other Cases

The U.S. Supreme Court closed out its January sitting with oral arguments in four cases. The issues before the justices ranged from where a vape company can bring suit against the FDA to whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

Below is a brief summary of the cases before the Court:

McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation: Under the Hobbs Act, federal courts of appeals have “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of all final orders of the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) made reviewable” by 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). The issue before the Court is whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the FCC’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.: The case stems from the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) denial of an application to market e-cigarettes. Under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, entities must obtain authorization from FDA before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. If FDA denies an application for authorization, “any person adversely affected by such … denial may file a petition for judicial review of such … denial with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which such person resides or has their principal place of business.” The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that a manufacturer may seek judicial review in that circuit even if it neither resides nor has its principal place of business there, so long as its petition is joined by a seller of its products, such as a gas station or convenience store, based in the circuit. The Court has agreed to determine “[w]hether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the D.C. Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located within that circuit.”

Cunningham v. Cornell University: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) prohibits a plan fiduciary from “engag[ing] in a transaction, if he knows or should know that such transaction constitutes a direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest.” The statute elsewhere defines “party in interest” broadly to include a variety of parties that may contract with or provide services to a plan. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the text of this prohibition as written. The Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have, on the other hand, required plaintiffs to allege additional elements to state a claim, because a “literal reading” of 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) would purportedly produce “results that are inconsistent with ERISA’s statutory purpose.” The Court has now agreed to decide whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision’s text.

Barnes v. Felix: The Fourth Amendment prohibits a police officer from using “unreasonable” force. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), the Supreme Court held that reasonableness depends on “the totality of the circumstances.” However, four circuits — the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth — cabin Graham. Those circuits evaluate whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred under the “moment of the threat doctrine,” which evaluates the reasonableness of an officer’s actions only in the narrow window when the officer’s safety was threatened, and not based on events that precede the moment of the threat. In contrast, eight circuits — the First, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits — follow the totality of the circumstances approach, including evaluating the officer’s actions leading up to the use of force. The Court will now resolve the circuit split be deciding whether courts should apply the moment of the threat doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.