Supreme Court Kicks Off February Argument Session

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in four cases this week, all of which asked the justices to resolve a circuit split. The issues ranged from whether a death row defendant can obtain postconviction DNA testing to what test courts should apply to Title VII discrimination claims brought by a member of a majority group (i.e. heterosexual, white, etc.)

Below is a brief summary of the issues before the justices:

Gutierrez v. Saenz: The case involves whether a Texas death-row inmate can sue the state for DNA test­ing in sup­port of his inno­cence claim.  In Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 234 (2023), the Supreme Court held that Rodney Reed had standing to pursue a declaratory judgment that Texas’s post-conviction DNA statute was unconstitutional because ”Reed suffered an injury in fact,” the named defendant “caused Reed’s injury,” and if a federal court concludes that Texas’s statute violates due process, it is “substantially likely that the state prosecutor would abide by such a court order.” In this case, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to follow Reed and formulated its own novel test for Article III standing, which centers on whether the defendants in a particular case would actually redress the plaintiff’s injury by complying with a federal court’s declaratory judgment. The Fifth Circuit’s new test conflicts with Reed and creates a circuit split with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal. The justices have agreed to decide the following question: Whether Article III standing requires a particularized determination of whether a specific state official will redress the plaintiff’s injury by following a favorable declaratory judgment.

Perttu v. Richards: The case centers on the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” The Sixth Circuit held that prisoners have a right to a jury trial on the question whether they have exhausted their administrative remedies under the PLRA where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim. This decision created a circuit split with the Seventh Circuit, which held that courts, not juries, must determine whether a prisoner has exhausted his or her administrative remedies, regardless of whether exhaustion is intertwined with the merits of the case. The Court will now determine “[w]hether, in cases subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, prisoners have a right to a jury trial concerning their exhaustion of administrative remedies where disputed facts regarding exhaustion are intertwined with the underlying merits of their claim.”

Esteras v. United States: The supervised-release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), lists factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) for a court to consider when sentencing a person for violating a supervised release condition. In that list, Congress omitted the factors set forth in

section 3553(a)(2)(A) — the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the

offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment for the offense. Five circuit courts of appeals have concluded that district courts may rely on the section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. Four circuit courts of appeals have concluded that they may not. The Supreme Court will now weigh in, deciding: “Whether, even though Congress excluded 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) from 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)’s list of factors to consider when revoking supervised release, a district court may rely on the Section 3553(a)(2)(A) factors when revoking supervised release.”

Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services: The case involvesthe standard courts apply in discrimination claims brought by majority group plaintiffs. The specific question before the justices is “[w]hether, in addition to pleading the other elements of an employment discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a majority-group plaintiff must show “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”

Decisions in all of the cases are expected before the term ends in June/July. Please check back for updates.