Supreme Court Expands Judicial Review of Agency Actions

In McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. ____ (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Hobbs Act does not bind district courts in civil enforcement proceedings to an agency’s interpretation of a statute. Rather, district courts must independently determine the law’s meaning under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation while affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.

The Supreme Court’s decision further limits the deference federal courts must give to an agency’s legal interpretations, continuing the trend started in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). In that case, the Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of a law simply because a statute is ambiguous.

Facts of the Case

McKesson Corporation, a healthcare company, sent unsolicited fax advertisements through a subsidiary in 2009 and 2010 to medical practices, including McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates. McLaughlin sued McKesson in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of

California in 2014 for damages and an injunction, alleging Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) violations for faxing unsolicited advertisements without the required opt-out notices. McLaughlin also sought to represent a class of fax recipients who received the advertisements either on traditional fax machines or through online fax services.

The TCPA protects businesses and consumers from intrusive telemarketing by prohibiting unsolicited fax advertisements to “telephone facsimile machines” absent an opt-out notice informing recipients that they can choose not to receive future faxes. The Act provides a private right of action with statutory minimum damages of $500 per violation.

The District Court certified the class without distinguishing between the two methods of receipt. While McLaughlin’s lawsuit was pending, a company petitioned the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for a declaratory ruling about whether the TCPA applies to faxes received through online fax services. Months after class certification, the FCC issued the Amerifactors order, interpreting “telephone facsimile machine” in the TCPA to exclude online fax services.

Following Ninth Circuit precedent that FCC final orders are reviewable exclusively in the courts of appeals under the Hobbs Act, the District Court deemed the Amerifactors order binding and granted summary judgment to McKesson on claims involving online fax services. The court then decertified the class, leaving McLaughlin with claims for only 12 faxes received on a traditional machine and damages of $6,000. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed by a vote 6-3. “The Hobbs Act does not preclude district

courts in enforcement proceedings from independently assessing whether an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute is correct,” Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote on behalf of the majority. “Here, therefore, the District Court should interpret the TCPA under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.”

In reaching its decision, the Court explained that there are three categories of statutes which authorize pre-enforcement judicial review of a federal agency’s statutory interpretation: statutes that expressly preclude judicial review in enforcement proceedings; statutes that expressly authorize or contemplate review in both pre-enforcement and enforcement proceedings; and statutes like the Hobbs Act that are silent about judicial review in enforcement proceedings.

The Court went on to find that for the third category, fundamental principles of administrative law establish the proper default rule. In enforcement proceedings, district courts must independently determine whether an agency’s statutory interpretation is correct, rather than being bound by the agency’s interpretation.

As Justice Kavanaugh explained, this presumption of judicial review is codified in Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that agency action is subject to judicial review in enforcement proceedings except where there is prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for review.

In this case, because the Hobbs Act does not expressly preclude review in enforcement proceedings, the default rule applies. “The Hobbs Act does not preclude district courts in enforcement proceedings from independently assessing whether an agency’s interpretation of the relevant statute is correct,” Justice Kavanaugh explained. “Here, therefore, the District Court should interpret the TCPA under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency’s interpretation.”