SCOTUS Rules Abscondment Doesn’t Toll Term of Supervised Release

In Rico v. United States, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant’s term of supervised release when the defendant fails to report to a probation officer.

Facts of the Case

Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, supervised release serves as a transitional period between incarceration and freedom. While on supervised release, a criminal defendant must comply with various conditions, some of which may be imposed at the discretion of the sentencing judge.

Common discretionary conditions include “report[ing] to a probation officer as directed” and “notify[ing] the probation officer promptly of any change in address.” Should a defendant violate any prescribed condition, whether mandatory or discretionary, a judge may revoke his release and order him returned to prison. A judge may also require the defendant to serve an additional “term of supervised release after [his] imprisonment.”

After petitioner Isabel Rico violated the terms of her supervised release conditions, the judge revoked her release and ordered her to serve two months of additional imprisonment and a new 42-month term of supervised release set to expire in 2021. When released the second time, Rico again violated her conditions by changing her residence without notifying her probation officer. A warrant issued for her arrest, but federal authorities did not locate her until January 2023.

During her abscondment, Rico committed a state law drug offense in January 2022, which resulted in a conviction. Back in federal district court, the judge treated Rico’s drug offense as a Grade A violation of her supervised release conditions and sentenced her to 16 months of incarceration followed by two more years of supervised release. Rico appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to treat her drug offense as a supervised release violation because that offense occurred after her supervised term expired in June 2021.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, describing Rico’s abscondment as having “tolled” the clock so that her term continued to run until federal authorities caught up with her in 2023. Because of that, the Ninth Circuit held that Rico’s January 2022 drug offense could count as a violation of her federal supervised release.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of 8-1. It held that Rico’s “abscondment” did not toll her term of supervised release.

“The Sentencing Reform Act provides courts with many tools to address defendants who fail to report or otherwise violate their supervised release conditions,” Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote on behalf of the majority. “But automatically extending a term of supervised release is not among them.”

In reaching its decision, the majority emphasized that what the Ninth Circuit’s challenged rule really does is use a defendant’s abscondment to extend (not toll) the period of supervised release beyond what a judge has ordered.“The government seeks not a rule that stops the clock or ensures a defendant takes no advantage of abscondment, but one that imposes new punishment by automatically extending supervised release,” Justice Gorsuch wrote.

The majority then found that automatically extending a term of supervised release is not among the various tools the Sentencing Reform Act provides courts to address defendants who violate their supervised release conditions.“The Act already provides many ways to ensure defendants do not profit from violations without automatically extending the period beyond what a judge ordered,” Justice Gorsuch wrote.

Looking to the text of the statute, the majority noted that the Act instructs that a term of supervised release starts “the day the person is released from imprisonment,” and generally sets maximum lengths at one, three, or five years depending on the severity of the underlying offense. “Neither provision hints at anything like the Ninth Circuit’s automatic extension rule,” Justice Gorsuch wrote. “To the contrary, that rule risks flouting the Act by permitting courts to extend supervised release beyond even the maximum terms set by Congress.”

Finally, the majority rejected the arguments raised by the Government. As Justice Gorsuch explained, the Government argued that because supervision requires “observation and direction,” and Rico received neither while absconding, she should receive no “credit” for that period. But the cited provisions merely describe the probation officer’s duties and indicate that supervision occurs only “during the term imposed” by the sentencing court, which hurts rather than helps the government’s cause. “In a very real sense, then, the government asks us to imagine that Ms. Rico was both off and on supervised release at the same time,” Justice Gorsuch wrote. “Really, it is quite the puzzle.”

Dissent

Justice Samuel Alito dissented. He argued that the district court revoked Rico’s supervision properly and appropriately considered her offenses after the term of supervision expired.

“It seems strange to regard a crime committed after the expiration of ‘unsupervised supervised release’ as a non-event,” Justice Alito wrote. “By that logic, if petitioner had gone on a murder spree after the expiration of the period of unsupervised supervised release, the sentencing judge would have been required to put that out of his mind.”