SCOTUS Holds No Minimum Contacts Required for Personal Jurisdiction Over Foreign States Under FSIA

In CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 605 U.S. ____ (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the requirements to establish personal jurisdiction over foreign states under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). The justices unanimously held that FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity.

Facts of the Case

Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. signed a satellite-leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., which is owned by the Republic of India for use by its Department of Space. However, when the Indian Government subsequently determined it needed more satellite capacity for itself, Antrix terminated the contract under the agreement’s force majeure clause.

To resolve their subsequent contract dispute, the parties proceeded to arbitration. After unanimously concluding that Antrix had breached the contract, the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages plus interest. Devas then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington to confirm the award. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. It determined that personal jurisdiction was lacking under FSIA, “which provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an immunity exception applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. §1330(b).

The Ninth Circuit did not question that Antrix is a “foreign state” under the FSIA, that an immunity exception applies, and that Devas effectuated proper service. Citing Circuit precedent, the appeals court explained that the Act imposes an additional requirement: “personal jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a traditional minimum contacts analysis” as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945), and its progeny. Applying that standard, the Ninth Circuit found that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Antrix because Antrix lacked sufficient suit-related contacts with the United States. 

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that holding that the FSIA’s statutory requirements exclusively determine personal jurisdiction over foreign states. Justice Samuel Alito wrote on behalf of the unanimous Court.

In reaching its decision, the Court looked to FSIA’s personal-jurisdiction provision. As Justice Alito observed, the provision establishes two substantive requirements: 1. the district court must have subject-matter jurisdiction, which the FSIA grants whenever an enumerated immunity exceptions applies; and 2. service must be made under the FSIA’s specialized service-of-process rules. “Thus, the most natural reading of §1330(b) is that personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is ‘automatic’ whenever (1) ‘an exception to immunity applies’ and (2) ‘service of process has been accomplished,’” Justice Alito explained.

The Court went on to emphasize that any reference to “minimum contacts” is notably absent in FSIA’s text. “And we decline to add in what Congress left out: the FSIA was supposed to ‘clarify the governing standards,’ not hide the ball,” Justice Alito wrote.

While the Court acknowledged that the FSIA’s immunity exceptions themselves require varying degrees of suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed, it found that

“[t]he text and structure of the FSIA demonstrate that Congress did not require ‘minimum contacts’ over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions.”

The Supreme Court went on to reject Ninth Circuit’s contrary arguments, holding that they could not override the plain meaning of the FSIA’s personal-jurisdiction provision. As Justice Alito explained, the fact that one of the immunity exceptions contains language resembling the minimum-contacts test says little about whether a jurisdictional provision located elsewhere categorically imposes that test.

Additionally, the legislative history cited by the Ninth Circuit shows only that Congress believed the contacts set forth in the Act’s then-existing immunity exceptions satisfy due process, not that the personal-jurisdiction provision silently includes an atextual minimum-contacts requirement.

Notably, the Court left open for consideration on remand the question whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment “itself requires a showing of minimum contacts.”