SCOTUS Decision in Bowe v. United States Is First of the 2026 Term

In Bowe v. United States, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1) does not bar the Court’s review of a federal prisoner’s request to file a second or successive Section 2255 motion for postconviction relief, and Subsection 2244(b)(1) does not apply to second or successive motions filed under Section 2255(h) by federal prisoners challenging their convictions or sentences. It was the Supreme Court’s first ruling of the 2026 term.

Facts of the Case

Petitioner Michael S. Bowe is serving a 24-year sentence in federal custody after pleading guilty in 2008 to three offenses: (1) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery; (2) attempted Hobbs Act robbery; and (3) using a firearm in relation to a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)(A). Bowe’s §924(c) conviction carried a mandatory 10-year sentence to be served consecutively to his sentence for the robbery offenses. 

This case concerns Bowe’s efforts to obtain postconviction relief from the mandatory consecutive 10-year sentence imposed under §924(c). A comprehensive statutory scheme governs when and how state and federal prisoners can seek postconviction relief in federal court, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2254 (state prisoners) and §2255 (federal prisoners). 

As relevant to Bowe’s case, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or subsequent efforts at obtaining postconviction relief require the prisoner first to seek certification from a court of appeals that the filing meets threshold conditions before a prisoner can proceed in a district court. While §§2244 and 2255(h) have distinct requirements, §2255(h) cross-references some of the procedures in §2244 for how a “panel of the appropriate court of appeals” “certifie[s]” a second or successive filing.

Bowe first sought §2255 relief in 2016, arguing that §924(c)’s residual clause was unconstitutional. The District Court denied the motion, reasoning that—regardless of the residual clause’s constitutionality—Bowe’s §924(c) conviction was proper because attempted Hobbs Act robbery qualified as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.

In 2019, after the Supreme Court held that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague n United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), Bowe sought permission from the Eleventh Circuit under §2255(h) to file a second or successive motion. A three-judge panel found that Bowe had not met §2255(h)’s threshold conditions. 

Although the panel acknowledged that Davis announced a new, retroactive constitutional rule (one of the two statutory gateways for successive motions under §2255(h)(2)), it held that Bowe could not make a prima facie showing that his §924(c) conviction was unconstitutional because then-binding Circuit precedent still treated attempted Hobbs Act robbery as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause.

In United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), the Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Bowe once again sought authorization under §2255(h), arguing that Davis and Taylor leave none of his convictions as a valid predicate “crime of violence” under §924(c). 

A panel dismissed the part of Bowe’s request resting on Davis, reasoning that the claim had been “presented in a prior application” and that the panel lacked jurisdiction over such old claims under §2244(b)(1). The panel also denied the part of Bowe’s request that rested on Taylor, concluding that Taylor did not announce a new constitutional rule within the meaning of §2255(h)(2).

Bowe returned to the Eleventh Circuit several times, seeking authorization to pursue postconviction relief, initial hearing en banc, and reversal of Circuit precedent applying §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions. He also requested certification of the question whether §2244(b)(1) applies to federal prisoners. See §1254(2). After Bowe’s requests were denied, he eventually filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Majority Decision

By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court vacated the lower court’s decision. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote on behalf of the majority. She was joined by Justices John Roberts, Elena Kagan, Brett Kavanaugh, and Ketanji Brown Jackson.

The Supreme Court first addressed whether §2244(b)(3)(E), which prohibits the “denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application” from being the “subject of a petition for . . . a writ of certiorari,” bars the Court’s review of authorization decisions concerning the motions of federal prisoners. According to the majority, the provision does not apply to federal prisoners.

“This court has certiorari jurisdiction over any ‘[c]as[e] in the courts of appeals…upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree,’” Justice Sotomayor wrote. “Given that broad grant of jurisdiction, Congress must speak clearly if it seeks to impose exceptions to that jurisdiction.”

In further support, the majority emphasized that Congress treated state and federal prisoners differently across AEDPA, with state prisoners often facing far higher hurdles to relief. Accordingly, the majority found that allowing further review in the Court is consistent with both AEDPA’s purposes and practical considerations.

The Supreme Court next turned to whether §2244(b)(1), which directs courts to dismiss a claim “presented in a second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a prior application,” applies to motions filed by federal prisoners. The Court also answered no to this question, concluding that “by its plain terms,” §2244(b)(1)’s old-claim bar applies only to state prisoners.

“If Bowe were in state custody, then the government would be correct,” Justice Sotomayor wrote for the majority. “He is not.”

The majority further concluded that Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference to §2244 does not make §2244(b)(1) applicable to federal prisoners’ successive §2255 motions. As Justice Sotomayor explained, the argument is erroneous under the same reasoning that explains why the Court has jurisdiction. Section 2255(h)’s cross-reference incorporates the procedures in §2244 only as they relate to how a panel certifies a second or successive filing.

“At bottom, the Government’s arguments suggest that §2255(h)’s cross-reference might include §2244(b)(3)(E)’s certiorari bar. They do not, however, provide the necessary clear indication that Congress intended to close our doors to a class of habeas petitioners seeking review,” Justice Sotomayor explained. “Absent such clear indication, federal prisoners are not prohibited from seeking certiorari from a panel’s denial of authorization to file a second or successive motion.”

Dissent

Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissent, which was joined in full by Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas and in part by Justice Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court lacked certiorari jurisdiction, and criticized the majority for “devising a broad new legal rule that even express limitations on our certiorari jurisdiction are unenforceable absent a clear statement.”

“Everyone agrees this provision precludes us from exercising certiorari jurisdiction to review an appellate panel’s decision granting or denying certification to state prisoners. And because §2255(h) tells us that the same rules apply to federal prisoners, exactly the same outcome follows for federal prisoners like Mr. Bowe,” Justice Gorsuch added.