Supreme Court Rules ISP Not Liable for Copyright Infringement

In Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, 607 U.S. ___ (2026), the U.S. Supreme Court held that Cox Communications neither induced its users’ infringement of copyrighted works nor provided a service tailored to infringement. Accordingly, the Internet service provider is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

Facts of the Case

Cox Communications, Inc. is an Internet service provider serving approximately six million subscribers, each associated with a unique Internet Protocol address. Internet service providers like Cox have limited knowledge about how their services are used; they know which IP address corresponds to which subscriber account but cannot distinguish individual users or directly control how services are used. Cox contractually prohibits subscribers from using their connection to post, copy, transmit, or disseminate content that infringes copyrights.

Sony Music Entertainment and other major music copyright owners enlisted MarkMonitor to track copyright infringement across the Internet. MarkMonitor’s software detects when copyrighted works illegally uploaded or downloaded and traces the activity to particular IP addresses. During the roughly two-year period at issue, MarkMonitor sent Cox 163,148 notices identifying IP addresses of Cox subscribers associated with infringement.

Sony sued Cox in Federal District Court, advancing two theories of secondary copyright liability. First, Sony alleged that Cox contributed to its users’ infringement by continuing to provide Internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses Cox knew were associated with infringement. Second, Sony alleged that Cox was vicariously liable for its users’ infringement.

The jury found in favor of Sony on both theories, found Cox’s infringement willful, and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. The District Court denied Cox’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Fourth Circuit affirmed as to contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is exactly the sort of culpable conduct sufficient for contributory infringement. The Fourth Circuit reversed as to vicarious liability.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court reversed. “Under our precedents, a company is not liable as a copyright infringer for merely providing a service to the general public with knowledge that it will be used by some to infringe copyrights,” Justice Clarence Thomas wrote on behalf of the unanimous Court. “Accordingly, we reverse.”

In his opinion, Justice Thomas explained that although the Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another, the Court has recognized two specific forms of secondary copyright liability, “contributory” liability and “vicarious” liability.

Contributory liability, which was at issue in the case, requires that a provider intended its service to be used for infringement, for which a copyright owner can show the requisite intent in two ways. First, it can show that a party affirmatively induced the infringement. Second, it can show that the party sold a service tailored to infringement.

In this case, the Court determined that because Cox neither induced its users’ infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement, it is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony’s copyrights.

Justice Thomas explained that “[a] provider induces infringement if it actively encourages infringement through specific acts.” In this case, “Cox did not ‘induce’ or ‘encourage’ its subscribers to infringe in any manner. Sony provided no ‘evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote’ infringement.”

The Court went on to explain that “[a] service is tailored to infringement if it is ‘not capable of “substantial” or “commercially significant” noninfringing uses.’” Here, Justice Thomas stated: “Cox’s Internet service was clearly ‘capable of “substantial” or “commercially significant” noninfringing uses.’

Cox did not tailor its service to make copyright infringement easier. Cox simply provided Internet access, which is used for many purposes other than copyright infringement.”

The Court also criticized the Fourth Circuit’s holding, explaining that it went beyond the two forms of contributory liability recognized in the Court’s precedents. “Holding Cox liable merely for failing to terminate Internet service to infringing accounts would expand secondary copyright liability beyond our precedents,” Justice Thomas wrote.